

ROHINGYA REFUGEE CRISIS IN BANGLADESH: POST-COVID SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT ON HOST COMMUNITY

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ABSTRACT

The Rohingya are an ethnic minority based in Myanmar. Since the independence of Myanmar in 1948, Rohingya's claim of separate ethnic identity has been recognized by the government of Premier Thakhin U Nu. Rohingyas were stateless without a legitimate nationality in 1962 when the military ruler General Ne Win denied them citizenship. Numerous of them were forced to resettle in Bangladesh and other neighboring countries and they sought asylum. In 1978, when Myanmar's military junta propelled Operation Nagamin, thousands of Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh. A huge number of Rohingyas started to reach Bangladesh in 1991, 1992, and 2012. Around 87000 Rohingya escaped to Bangladesh from October 2016 to July 2017, after military reprisal. Presently, around a million Rohingyas are living in Bangladesh. Prolonged negotiation has failed to resolve the Rohingya refugee crisis. Besides that, during the post-Covid period, inflation affected Bangladesh's economy, security, and socio-political stability. The present paper attempts to analyze the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh and its socio-economic impact on the host community during the post-Covid period. The presence of a large number of Rohingya people is putting pressure on the local environment, economic, social, cultural, health, and security aspects of Bangladesh.

Keywords: Bangladesh-Myanmar, host community, post-Covid, Rohingya, socio-economic impact.

INTRODUCTION

Myanmar was once Burma¹, a country in Southeast Asia. It connects South and Southeast Asia. It shares borders with Bangladesh, India, China, Laos, and Thailand. Its geographical location and natural resources have given it a noteworthy position in South and Southeast Asia. Myanmar gained independence from British colonial rule on the 4th January 1948. It is a

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country of 135 ethnic groups. The composition of different ethnic groups falls under the eight major groups: Arakan/Rakhine, Barman/Burmans, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni/Kayah, Mon, and Shan (Smith, 1999: 29-30). Of these groups, Burmese/Barmans constitute 70% of the total population (*The Daily Kaler Khantho*, 2018). The country's ethnic composition is one of the most complex composites in the world, with over 100 languages and dialects. Among the total population of Myanmar, approximately 4% are Muslims and among these Muslims, only one million are Rohingya Muslims (International Religious Freedom Report, 2022). The Rohingya Muslims are a combination of varied racial groups; encompassing the Arabs, Moghuls, and Bengalis (Alam, 2013: 3-5).

A great debate exists about the ancestries of the Rohingya community of the Arakan/Rakhine region. Among these, two contradictory views are the most influential. The first one considers Rohingyas as illegitimate immigrants from Bengal/Bangladesh (Saw, 2011). The second view recognizes Rohingyas as natives of the Arakan state including offspring of the original Muslims converted on Ramree atoll (Forster, 2011: 63-70). Although these two opposing views deal with the root of the Rohingya community, in reality, a great number of Muslims have existed in the Arakan state for hundreds of years (Azad, and Jasmine, 2013: 25-35). Their history can be traced back to the early seventh century when Arab Muslim traders settled in the area. Therefore, it is also recognized that they are physically, linguistically, and culturally similar to South Asians, especially Bengali people, and have linguistic similarities with the people of Chittagong.²

Historically, the Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh to escape acute suppression in Myanmar. The religious conflict between the Rohingyas and Buddhists happened particularly in the Muslim-dominated northern part of Rakhine state. In the past few years, the ethnic violence against the Rohingya community has become widespread within Rakhine State which has turned into ethnic cleansing and genocide (Khan, 2017). Facing severe human rights abuses and massive ill-treatment by the military government, Rohingya people sought to take refuge out of Rakhine state in large numbers during various periods such as in the year 1784, 1942, 1978, 1992, 2016, and 2017. Since 25th August 2017, the world started to perceive the plight of Rohingyas as a humanitarian crisis (AKM, and Diotima, 2018: 541-565). With the alarming increase in the number of worldwide refugees, the number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh has also increased as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 923,000 Rohingyas have come to Bangladesh between 1978 to 2017 to escape the persecution of Myanmar military (Sattar, 2017). Currently, 967,842 Rohingyas are living in Bangladesh (Global Refugee Forum, 2023).

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1. Burma was renamed Myanmar by the military government in June 1989. Much of the discussion in this paper refers to the period when it was known as Burma. To avoid confusion, both Myanmar and Burma name has been used interchangeably.
 2. Greater Chittagong is a south-eastern district of Bangladesh close to Arakan. During British rule in Arakan, a lot of Bengalis went to Arakan as seasonal laborers but the majority of them came back following the massacre in Arakan.

The international assistance to deal with the Rohingya problem which has been going on for more than six years is on a downward trend and the importance of this global crisis in the international arena has decreased. The Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh has now become a huge burden. Besides, post-Covid global instability and rising commodity prices have seriously impacted Bangladesh's economy, security, and socio-political stability. The prolonged presence of a large number of Rohingya people poses threats to the local environment and puts pressure on economic, social, cultural, and health insecurity, human trafficking, and prostitution, drug-related crimes and smuggling, cross-border insurgency, and recruitment of Rohingyas into militancy. Social unrest and security concerns for the host community also emerged from the influx of a large number of Rohingya refugees. The impacts of the crisis are heavier for Bangladesh because Bangladesh herself is an over-populated country and is passing through an economic transition.

The purpose of the present paper is to bring into focus the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh and analyze the post-Covid socio-economic impact on the host community. The paper is divided into five sections including introduction and conclusion. The second section tries to describe the historical background of the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar/Burma. The third section attempts to analyze the Rohingya refugee crisis and Bangladesh. Finally, this paper critically examines the post-Covid impact of the socio-economic of the Rohingya refugees on their host community in Bangladesh in the fourth section.

This paper is descriptive and explanatory and based on secondary sources of data such as books, journals, articles, periodicals, internet sources, and local, national, and international newspapers, magazines, and reports (UNHCR, MSF, Human Rights Watch and Arakan Project), commentaries and documents of government, non-government and international organizations.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ROHINGYA CRISIS IN MYANMAR/BURMA

The origin of the Rohingya people can be traced to the fifteenth century. In the pre-colonial period, Arakan (now Rakhine state) was populated by Muslim Arabic sailors from 788-810 AD and later by Bengalis from the fifteenth to seventeenth century (Ahmad, 2014: 20-25). The harmony between Rohingyas and Arakanese rifted following the Anglo-Burmese war in 1825 AD. This rift was deepened later when the Rohingyas expressed their loyalty to the British, while Arakanese Buddhists sided with the Japanese in the Second World War (Ullah, 2011: 139-161). After the independence from British colonial rule in 1948, Rohingya's claim of separate ethnic identity was recognized by the first democratic government of Premier U Nu (1948-1962). Rohingyas became stateless without a legal nationality in 1962 when the new military ruler General Ne Win (1962-1988) denied them citizenship (Arraiza, 2015: 3). Since 1978, many of them have been forced to migrate to Bangladesh, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia. Figure 1 shows the extent of the exodus of Rohingyas fleeing Myanmar. Since the late 1970s, nearly one million Rohingya Muslims have fled Myanmar due to widespread persecution.




Figure 1: The exodus of Rohingyas from Myanmar

Uncertainty in the lives of Rohingyas took a permanent form after the enactment of the controversial citizenship law the ‘National Citizen Act of 1982’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung Report, 2016). From the provision of the law, it is evident that it was deliberately designed to evict Rohingyas from their ancestral lands (Human Rights Watch, 2000). According to this law, there are three categories of citizenship status:

1. Full citizenship;
2. Associated citizenship; and
3. Naturalized citizenship.

A person is issued a color-coded citizenship security card consistent with his/her citizenship status: Pink, Blue, and Green respectively. A large number of Rohingyas do not fall under any of these three categories (Hossain, 2014: 16-17). The law provides a straightforward definition of citizen in section 2 (B) which the Rohingyas do not fulfill. Even in the process of preparing the voter list for the 1989 general election, a large number of Rohingya Muslims were excluded from the voter list. Thus, the irony of fate is that the Rohingyas have been confined to a cycle of acute discrimination, escape, trafficking, poverty, detention, and deportation.

In Myanmar, most Rohingyas have faced serious violations of human rights including restrictions on freedom of movement and marriage, exclusion from education and healthcare, forced birth control, arbitrary taxation, and forced labor. Rohingyas need to apply for a travel pass to visit a neighboring village and are required to obtain permission for marriage by paying high fees and bribes which can take several years. They are also beaten, tortured, killed, and raped by the Myanmar military. Amnesty International revealed a report in December 2016 which alleged that the Myanmar security forces were carrying out rapes and extrajudicial killings, burning their homes (Djamin, 2017). Many experts allege that Rohingyas are one of the world’s most oppressed and persecuted minority.

ROHINGYA REFUGEE CRISIS AND BANGLADESH

Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. Bangladesh's current population is 165,158,616 (16 crore 51 lakh 58 thousand 616) according to the 'Population and Housing Census 2022' report published by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). The country has a population density of 1,119 people per square kilometer, which ranks ninth in the world. India and Myanmar are the neighboring countries of Bangladesh. It is bordered by India in the west, north, and east and by Myanmar in the southeast.

Bangladesh and Myanmar are the two immediate neighbors. The general assumption is that both countries would have a better and friendly relationship if both had democracy in practice and political stability since their independence. People from both countries crossed their borders for various reasons. For instance, people from southeastern regions of Bangladesh used to go to Myanmar in search of business and economic fortunes and many opted to stay there for life marrying Rohingya women leaving behind even, in many cases, their original families in Bangladesh (Ahmad, 2008: 96-99). However, this situation changed after the independence of Myanmar, especially in the 1960s when the military regime strongly settled down in Myanmar.

In the 1970s, several crackdowns in Rakhine state forced thousands of Rohingya people to run away to neighboring countries particularly Bangladesh. In the 1970s, around 200,000 Rohingya people fled to East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh). After the independence of Bangladesh, the first influx of Rohingya people (approximately 300,000) took place in June 1978 (Amnesty International, 2004). Most of these refugees were repatriated to Myanmar by the end of 1978. Then another large influx took place in the year 1991-1992 when nearly 250,000 Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh amidst reported cases of rapes, forced labor, and religious persecution (Pandey,




Source: www.aljazeera.com/ (accessed July 2018)

Figure 2: Rohingya exodus from Rakhine state to Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh

2019). The repatriation process was started by the UNHCR through signing a memorandum of understanding with the Union of Myanmar. However, the process of repatriation was stopped unilaterally by the Myanmar authorities with effect from April 1997. Since then, the remaining Rohingyas have been living in Bangladesh (*The Daily Prothom Alo*, 2019). Figure 2 shows the Rohingya exodus from Rakhine state to Cox's Bazar district.

Bangladesh has two kinds of Rohingya refugees: registered refugees and unregistered refugees. Registered Rohingyas refugees are living in Leda and Khnila camps in Teknaf and Kutupalong refugee camps in Ukhiya Upzillas. Additionally, data show that, at present, 965,467 registered Rohingya refugees are living in Bangladesh (UNHCR Operations Worldwide Report, 2023). Unregistered Rohingya refugees are living almost everywhere in Bangladesh, especially in Cox's Bazar³ district and Chittagong division. These unregistered Rohingyas are often blamed for many illegal activities like terrorism, and felling trees in the forest. They are also accused of engaging as day laborers resulting in lower wages for the local day laborers. Unfortunately, nobody knows the real number of unregistered Rohingya refugees. About 300,000 to 500,000 refugees have been living unregistered in Bangladesh (*Agence France-Presse*, 2015). Even now, several Rohingyas are crossing the border and going to different parts of the country regularly. But there is no special policy for them. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the Rohingyas in different areas of Cox's Bazar.



Source: Report on Humanitarian Data Exchange, Inter Sector Coordination Group, 30 June 2021

Figure 3: Distribution of the Rohingyas in Cox's Bazar (%)

3. Cox's Bazar is the south-eastern district of Bangladesh along Arakan of Myanmar where the majority of the Rohingyas refugees presently reside.

To enter Bangladesh is easy as Bangladesh-Myanmar border is geographically safe to cross. The boundary of the two countries is shared by water and land border. Most of the Rohingyas cross the water boundary by boat. In this way, hundreds of thousands of unregistered Rohingya refugees entered Bangladesh and are living in Bangladesh after leaving Myanmar decades ago. Meanwhile, the reputation of Bangladesh has considerably suffered in the international arena as some of the unregistered Rohingyas refugees have been found to get involved in nefarious crimes- including the import of Yaba⁴ drugs, and using fake Bangladeshi passports, not to mention the fact that the law-and-order situations in the neighboring areas of the hill tracts have been under threat from a huge potential demographic turmoil.

POST-COVID SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT ON HOST COMMUNITY

Bangladesh is a densely populated country with limited land and natural resources. Also, due to rapid urbanization and industrialization, the arable land is shrinking very fast. The prolonged presence of a large number of Rohingya people is putting pressure on the local environment, economic, social, cultural, health, and security of the country. They are creating various kinds of awful problems for Bangladesh especially adverse socio-economic impacts on host communities during the post-Covid period. Because of post-Covid global instability, rising commodity prices have seriously impacted Bangladesh's economy, security, and socio-political stability. The effect of a large number of Rohingya on Bangladesh is highlighted in the following sections.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

The environmental impact of hosting 1.2 million Rohingya refugees is difficult to measure. Environmental degradation is caused mainly by deforestation. The majority of the Rohingya refugee camps are situated in the hillside area. Both registered and unregistered Rohingyas are involved in clearing the forests, cutting the hills for their shelter, residing here and there, and causing significant damage to the environment (*The Daily Kaler Khantho*, 2019). More than 2,000 hectares of forest have been lost due to the influx of some 750,000 Rohingyas since August 2017 (*The Daily Star*, 2019). Forests began to be converted into agricultural land, collection of firewood from forests, extraction of surface and ground waters, fishing and hunting, and production of extra waste threatens human health.

Rohingya refugees impact the host community heavily as every year water level of Ukhia (an upazila of Cox's Bazar district) is dropping. Reportedly drop by 3-5 feet every year has been reported after the Rohingyas influx into Cox's Bazar (Humanitarian Response Plan, 2017- 2018). Because of the intense water demand of a large number of Rohingyas, the level of water could further dip which is a grave concern for both locals and the Rohingya population. Besides, the daily movement of a large number of Rohingyas, aid workers, and humanitarian relief vehicles on the roads, leading from the host communities to the camps, is causing substantial wear and tear on roads and polluting the air of Ukhia and Teknaf.

4. Yaba is an infamous psychedelic drug tablet in South and Southeast Asia that is very popular among youth.

ECONOMIC PRESSURE

The Rohingya crisis has both short and long-term impacts on the local and national economy. Cox's Bazar, being one of the poorly populated cities in Bangladesh, demands extra economic provision in different fields for its development and special treatment from the Bangladesh government and currently has to spend US\$ 300 million per month for the Rohingyas (*The New Age*, 2019) and has a huge potential to create social animosity between the local Bengali and Rohingya communities. Besides, Cox's Bazar being a coastal town attracts tourists and creates job markets for the locals but the presence of a lot of foreign aid workers brought price hikes in the market from where poor locals and day laborers buy their essentials. It creates grave dissatisfaction in their minds which ultimately creates the potential for animosity against the refugees (*The Washington Post*, 2018).

Officially refugees are not allowed to work outside the camp without permission, but many do so unofficially. On the other hand, approximately 200,000 unregistered Rohingyas living in Bangladesh without any relief/assistance, must work in various sectors. Rohingyas have adversely affected the local labor market with the supply of cheap labor and have created an unemployment problem. The Rohingyas control the entire local labor market. They are also involved in smuggling goods such as medicine, narcotics, cosmetics, fertilizer, sugar, and various kinds of electric instruments (*The Daily Prothom Alo*, 2010). Thus, this huge number of Rohingyas refugees are employed in the economy of Bangladesh, and their employability should exert a significant impact on the local economy, and host community and on their gradual integration and mainstreaming in Bangladesh. This is creating social unrest in Cox's Bazar and Bangladesh.

THE SOCIO-CULTURAL IMPACT OF THE ROHINGYA INFLUX

Rohingya are influencing the social dimension of culture. Rohingyas and Bangladeshis have a lot of differences in social mores, values, norms, ethics, and belief systems. Although Rohingya refugees are Bangla-speaking people they are not Bangladeshi. Their dialect is a deep mixture of Arabic, Hindi, Urdu, and Persian. Their dress, music, habits, culture, and even religious ceremonies are largely different from those of Bangladeshi people. For example, almost all Bangladeshi women go to schools and their birth rate is low, which is just the opposite for the Rohingya women. Their food diversity level is very low with little consumption of fruits, vegetables, and animal food (*The Daily Star*, 2019). They already have a diluted secular Bengali identity. They are orthodox in their religious belief while Bangladeshis are mostly liberal. Most of the Rohingyas are involved with Islamic religious parties. They are causing political intolerance in the political culture of Bangladesh. Today, Bangladeshis sentiment is not favorable for the cause of the Rohingyas.

IMPACT ON HEALTH

Since the rapid influx of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh began in 2017, myriad health issues among the refugees have arisen. The Rohingya problem is causing an increase in health insecurity. There is a risk of malnutrition and consequential diseases. Malnutrition remains unacceptably high. Among the children aged 6-59 months who fled after August 2017, 32% are chronically undernourished and 13% are acutely undernourished (*The Daily Star*, 2019).

There is always a looming fear of waterborne and other infectious diseases spreading beyond the camps. Any contagious disease, depending on the human host, has the potential to be an epidemic in densely packed camps. Again, many of the Rohingya people are already carrying the germs of several diseases like tuberculosis, skin diseases, HIV/AIDS, etc. (Muniruzzaman, 2017). The experience of refugee settlements in Haiti and Yemen reveals that diseases, along with diarrhea and cholera, could spread to the local population.

SECURITY THREATS

Security is the main concern for Bangladesh. The Rohingya crisis has implications for border security and continuing persecution in Rakhine state is likely to make the border of Bangladesh vulnerable and unstable. The Bangladesh-Myanmar border is also considered a hotbed of insurgency. The Rohingya Muslims of Arakan who have fled Myanmar as refugees and took shelter along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border areas are involved in guerilla activities against the Myanmar government under the banners of numerous guerilla groups. All these indicate that Bangladeshi borders have been experiencing hyperactivities of insurgent groups (Kabir, 2010: 104-131). It was reported that on 13 July 2018, a helicopter from Myanmar had violated the Bangladeshi airspace in Alikadam upazila of Bandarban which is a serious threat to the national security and stability of Bangladesh (*The Daily Dhaka Tribune*, 2018). To mark the second anniversary of the current exodus, on 25 August 2019, about five to seven hundred thousand Rohingyas gathered in the Kutupalong camp, many of them carrying sharp weapons. Though it seemed peaceful, it was a challenge for the Bangladesh government when, in unequivocal terms, they announced that they would not return to Myanmar if their demands were not met. It was not a plea but a challenge and a direct threat to the government of Bangladesh (*The New Age*, 2019).

On the other hand, the huge exodus of Rohingya people can be a potential threat to the internal security of Bangladesh. It cannot be denied that vulnerable Rohingya people are in dire necessity of a livelihood. In this way, they can be involved in various national as well as international 'terrorist' groups and can take the chance to exploit the vulnerable situation, causing disturbance to internal security. In Bangladesh, the Rohingya extremists are working especially in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. They have connections with different extremist Islamic groups in Bangladesh (Murshid, 2012: 5-7). They are closely connected with Qwami Madrasah. These Madrasahs are not only educational institutions but also training centers for Islamic militant groups. A lot of Rohingya religious teachers are involved in this training. Their main aim is to set up a separate Muslim state buffer zone in the Arakan region.

The Rohingya camps are fertile grounds for recruitment by Islamic militant groups. Rohingya have no formal and institutional knowledge about the contemporary world. Those who are supposed to be educated know the Quran, Hadith, and Arabic—however, a lack of explanation is rooted in contemporary knowledge. There are great chances for them to be converted easily as 'jihadist' by arousing their feelings of deprivation. Religious extremist groups will then come to fill the vacuum creating the potential to recruit militant groups. Now, Rohingya not only pose a security threat in Bangladesh but also all over South and Southeast Asia because of the allegations against them that they are involved in various conflict zones such as Afghanistan and Pakistan.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

The Rohingya refugee crisis has created a potential threat of human trafficking. Human trafficking as a form of organized crime creates security threats for states (Avdan, 2012: 172-173). In Bangladesh, there exists an organized human trafficking network incorporating local Bangladeshis, newly arrived Rohingyas, and the old ones who have been staying in refugee camps for a long time. This contains a high potential for security threats to Bangladesh and the region. As the Rohingyas are stateless and have no legal work opportunities in Bangladesh, they are very vulnerable to human trafficking and forced prostitution. Rohingya children, women, and men are targeted by the traffickers who seek to exploit them in various situations including the sex industry, as unpaid domestic help in homes, guesthouses or hotels, and in other forms of bonded labor (*The Daily Star*, 2018). Rohingya girls are also reportedly transported to Chittagong and Dhaka and transnationally to Kathmandu and Kolkata and subjected to work as sex workers.

Bangladesh has direct air, sea, and road communications with almost all drug-producing countries in the region, Cox Bazar's Naf River is used as the transit route by international drug traffickers and arms smugglers especially by Burmese drug traffickers (*The Daily Star*, 2003). The human trafficking routes active around 2010, are now being used to smuggle desperate Rohingya refugees out of Bangladesh (*The Daily Dhaka Tribune*, 2019). Another great concern is that Rohingyas agree to smuggle the drugs in return for safe passage, or for meager sums of money. Recently, an alarming number of Yaba pills have been seized by the security agencies of Bangladesh, and Rohingya involvement in most of the cases caused fear among Cox's Bazar administration. Moreover, Interpol says that about 5% of the world's drug trafficking is channeled through Bangladesh which is alarming for the national security of Bangladesh.

CONCLUSION

The exodus of the Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh is nothing new. Bangladesh has been experiencing continuous Rohingya flights into its territory since its inception in 1971. The largest number of Rohingya influx was triggered in 2017. The international assistance to deal with the Rohingya problem which has been going on for more than six years is on a downward trend and the importance of this global crisis in the international arena has decreased. The Rohingya crisis is becoming a huge burden for Bangladesh. The Rohingya crisis has short and long-term impacts on local and national economies and society. It poses a potential threat to the national security of Bangladesh as well as to regional stability.

The local community is suffering from price hikes and local laborers are losing their jobs to refugees. There are risks of malnutrition and diseases. waterborne and other infectious diseases might spread beyond the camps. Rohingyas are involved in clearing the forests, desecrating the hills for their shelter, and residing here and there, thus causing significant damage to the environment. They are disturbing social harmony through many illegal activities. The Rohingya crisis has implications for border security and continuous persecution in Rakhine state is likely to make the border of Bangladesh vulnerable and unstable. They are involved with various national as well as international terrorist groups and can take the chance to exploit the vulnerable situation, causing disturbance to Bangladesh's internal security. The Rohingya

refugee crisis has created a potential threat of human trafficking. Rohingyas are stateless and have no legal work opportunities in Bangladesh. Thus, they are very much vulnerable to human trafficking and forced prostitution.

The Rohingya refugee crisis has put a huge burden on Bangladesh because it is an over-populated country and is passing through an economic transition. Years of negotiation have failed to resolve the Rohingya refugee crisis. An acceptable solution may take many more years because the process has become complex and Myanmar's response to peaceful repatriation is not satisfactory. On the other hand, each Rohingya family was the owner of a piece of land in Arakan. Only giving back their land with a citizenship right under the Myanmar constitution can fulfill their demands. For a proper solution to the crisis, the Myanmar government must implement the Annan Commission Report and should address the three points of Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina for a peaceful future for the people of Rakhine and the region as a whole. International bodies like the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), ASEAN, OIC, and others ought to play a more active role in pressuring the Myanmar government to obey international laws regarding human rights and stop the persecution of Rohingya in Arakan. Otherwise, Bangladesh as a host of a huge number of Rohingya refugees will suffer socio-politically in the long run with its already existing multidimensional problems.

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